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BUSINESS COMBINATIONS REVISITED:
A TEMPORARY DEFENSE OF THE STATUS QUO
BY PHILIP L. DEFLIESE*
HERE WE Go AGAIN!
Bowing to the demands of a small number of long-standing critics of
the pooling-of-interests method of business combinations, the Financial
Accounting Standards Board [FASB] has placed on its growing agenda
the entire subject of business combinations for reconsideration. In ad-
dition to the requests stemming from conceptual disagreement, a con-
siderable number of requests had also been received for clarification and
interpretation of specific minor issues that had arisen in the area. Thus,
the decision to reopen the subject was taken in lieu of handling these
matters separately.
It is now more than three years since the Accounting Principles Board
[APB] of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
[AICPA] approved Opinion No. 16; Business Combinations, and No.
17, Intangible Assets. The issuance of these Opinions came after a two-
year open struggle of unprecedented intensity. (At various times, law-
suits were even threatened by members of industry and Board members.)
Then, this writer supported, and still does support, a strengthened pool-
ing concept. This position rests on the conviction that the concept pro-
vides the only viable method within an historical cost framework for
many types of combinations and that no other method will be feasible
until fundamental changes in accounting are agreed on.
This is not to suggest that present accounting methods for business
combinations should never be changed. It is merely a question of not
having found the right answer to a difficult problem. This writer has
always considered APB Opinions to be transitionary-a view whose va-
lidity many former Board members now freely concede, even though
they were extremely reluctant to express it when the Board was alive, -for
fear of detracting from the authority of the Opinions.' 'When account-
ing theory provides results closer to economic facts than it now does, we
* Managing Partner, Coopers & Lybrand; Past chairman of the Accounting Principles
Board, presently serving as a member of the Advisory Council to the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board. Copyright 1974 by Coopers & Lybrand, reprinted with
permission. This article is based upon presentations by the author at the Securities
Regulation Institute, San Diego, California and the D. R. Scott Memorial Lectures
in Accountancy at the University of Missouri-Columbia.
1 Only once did the Board admit this point. See American Institute of Certified Public
Accounts [AICPA], APB OPINION No. 8, PENsION COSTS (1966). [Hereinafter Opinions
and Statements of the APB will be cited without reference to the AICPA].
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may be able to develop superior approaches to the most difficult issues of
business combinations and goodwill.
It is well-known that Opinions 16 and 17 were derived from a single
proposed opinion that could not gain the necessary two-thirds vote of the
Board needed for approval, such was the diversity of views among the
18 members. Many members (including this writer) accepted Opinion
No. 17 only because it was necessary for compromise, and because they
believed that the effect upon business of the 40-year amortization re-
quirement would be minimal (and, in many cases, avoidable, by carefully
subscribing to the new pooling criteria). The drawbacks were a small
price to pay for the overall gain, principally the restoration of pooling
to its original posture.
If the FASB is to do justice to the question of poolings, its re-exami-
nation must explore:
1. The accounting and business environments that existed at the time
Opinions 16 and 17 were under consideration, which substantially
influenced their conclusion, and the extent to which these environ-
ments have, or have not, changed since.
2. The compromises that were made at the time--not only their nature
but also their immediate and long-term effects.
THE ACCOUNTING ENVIRONMENT THEN AND Now
In the early nineteen-sixties, just as it was getting under way, the
APB suffered a serious reversal that for a time threatened to destroy its
effectiveness. One of its first Opinions, concerned with the investment
tax credit, was overruled by the Securities and Exchange Commission
[SEC].' The profession had split on the issue and, after a traumatic
struggle, the AICPA Council ultimately pronounced APB Opinions bind-
ing on its membership. The SEC, moreover, consented to an understand-
ing that would preclude such disagreements,' At the same time, how-
ever, the Commission urged haste in getting on with the job of narrow-
ing accounting alternatives.
During this disturbed period, the APB was considering the possibility
of issuing a pronouncement on the basic concepts underlying financial
statements. As the subcommittee studying the question struggled to
reach agreement on a recommendation, it became apparent that no prog-
ress in that direction would be made unless the project were divided in
two: one to deal with the concepts as they were known to exist, and the
other to deal with what they should be for the future. A pronounce-
2 Following the investment credit debacle, the APB and SElC followed the practice of in.
formally resolving major differences before issuing pronouncements.
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ment on the former subject was finally issued, as a Statemene rather
than as an Opinion, in October 1970-at the same time as Opinions 16
and 17. The project dealing with future concepts was chaired by the
most vocal critic of present concepts, but it never got off the ground.
The immensity of this task was demonstrated when the AICPA in 1971
commissioned the special Study Group on Objectives of Financial State-
ments, whose report was released in the fall of 1973.
In 1968, about the time the APB began its stormy discussions on
business combinations, the AICPA published a research study on good-
will' a follow-up of an earlier study on business combinations. The au-
thors, two partners of Arthur Andersen, recommended that all business
combinations be recorded on the purchase method and that goodwill be
written off against stockholders' equity as of the date of acquisition-a
proposal that very few agreed with. This recommendation required the
acquired company's assets to be valued at current values while the ac-
quiring company's assets remained at cost, since historical cost was to
remain as the basic framework. Mergers were viewed as exchange trans-
actions on which a new cost basis would be established for the acquired
companies; this is the basic theory behind the purchase method.
When the Board began discussions on the subject of business com-
binations and goodwill, it was found that poolings vs. purchases and
goodwill amortization vs. no amortization represented only two positions
out of many prevailing among Board members. Some felt that a better
approach to fair value was needed, others clung tenaciously to historical
cost, and there were many positions and variations in between.
At the same time, there were many thorny accounting questions that
were troubling the Board, not confined to the subject of business combi-
nations but certainly relevant to it. A few of the many examples include:
1. Accounting methods for certain industries
Oil and gas. A wide variety of generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples were (and are) in use, producing considerable disparity in in-
come results.
Investment real estate. Accounting practices are far behind econom-
ic realities.
2. Treatment of certain items
Marketable securities. Many institutions, pension funds, insurance
companies, and conglomerates managing portfolios were using vary-
Ing accounting principles for the timing of capital gains as income
3 APB STATEMENT No. 4, BASIC CONCEPTS AND ACCOUNTING PRiNaPLEs UNDEPLY-
ING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (1970).
4 AICPA, AccoUNTiNG" RESEARCH STUDY No. 18, ACCOUNTING POR GOODWILL
(1968).
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and the valuation of affiliated companies. Accounting in this area
was often, and still is5 arbitrary.
Research and development. Costs can be, and are, either capitalized
or expensed, or partly so.
Depreciation and inventory valuation. A large number and variety
of methods are in use.
3. Financial reporting policies
Price-level financial statements. The use of these statements to sup-
plement the historical cost statement was recommended, but not re-
quired, by the APB. Although price-level statements represent a
first step toward fair value, the recommendation has been virtually
ignored.
This situation was further complicated by the fact that there was as
yet no way of establishing uniform approaches toward the implementa-
tion of AICPA pronouncements. The value of such uniformity was gen-
erally understood, but practicing accountants had not yet grasped the
necessity of working together to achieve it. Thus, AICPA pronounce-
ments were usually couched in general terms, allowing for the applica.
tion of judgment in their use. This was before the Institute adopted
the practice of issuing "unofficial" or "official" interpretations. As a
consequence, the SEC became the interpreter of .AICPA pronouncements
(without publishing its interpretations) and "precedent" accounting be-
came the vogue.
While all this was going on, a subtle and important change was tak-
ing place in the public mind. The public, which was heavily involved in
a fluctuating bull market, was beginning to view accounting as a measure-
ment of management performance; earnings per share [EPS], a statistic
invented by the financial analysts and adopted by the SEC, became more
important than absolute results. The public stockholder was not inter-
ested in the details, assuming that he could understand them. At first,
the accountants resisted a concept alien to their practice; later they
gave in and accepted responsibility for calculating BPS, albeit in gen-
eral terms. Methods of calculating EPS were rather loose, and the situa-
tion was chaotic until APB Opinion No. 150 (just before 16!) provided
a definitive "cookbook," with over 100 interpretations.
Pooling as a means of accounting for a merger evolved in the early
fifties, principally in response to the desire to avoid recording unrealistic
amounts of goodwill and otherwise inflating tle balance sheet values
5 However, APB OPINION No. 18, INVESTMENTS IN AFFLIATED COMPANIES (1971), has
considerably standardized practice in this narrow area.
6 APB OPINION No. 15, EARNINGS PER SHARE (1969).
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when high-priced stock was used as the merger vehicle. The SEC, his-
torically allergic to inflating values, embraced it. Its underlying prin-
ciple, concerned with a pooling of common equity interests involving no
expenditure of resources (cash or debt), was certainly sound at the time.
The criteria for qualifying as a pooling were spelled out in general terms
in ARB No. 48.7 But the absence of official interpretation on matters
arising in connection with pooling (the SEC provided day-to-day deter-
mination of which combinations qualified) paved the way for the spread
of certain dubious practices, many of which were aimed at immediately
creating unrealistic EPS results. Examples include:
Convertible preferred stock with nominal dividends, and other
unusual stock issues, were employed in mergers in lieu of common
stock at a time when disclosure of potential dilution by common stock
equivalents was not required.
Merger terms often provided for future issuances of stock contin-
gent on profitability of subsequent operations.
Shareholders of acquired companies were often guaranteed cash
prices for their new stock (from the company's resources) if certain
values were not ultimately realizable by the new shareholders. These
raised the question of whether purchasing was taking place.
Assets of pooled companies with low-cost bases were occasionally
sold off immediately by the acquiring companies for instant earnings
of sizable amounts.
When sizable amounts of cash or debt were employed in addition
to stock, a part-purchase, part-pooling accounting for one transaction
was allowed.
THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT THEN AND Now
It is not surprising that,, in these circumstances, pooling fell into dis-
repute. Nevertheless, these practices might have been tolerated for
longer than they were had it not been for the special market conditions
that prevailed in the late nineteen-sixties. During this period, a con-
tinually rising stock market created a growth-oriented mentality spurred
by the price/earnings multiple cult. One result was an unprecedented
number of mergers, motivated to a large extent by the ability to achieve
the results referred to above; the movement, in fact, reached its peak
at this time.
It was only to be expected that the intensification of merger activity
T AICPA, COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE, AccoUNTING RESEARCH BuLLE-
TiN No. 48, BUSINES s COMBINATIONS (1957).
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would be reflected in an increase in the objectionable pooling practices
described above. Boom periods are usually characterized by a discernible
lapse in financial responsibility, and the late sixties were no exception,
Abuses were.rife: the creation of instant EPS by means of "funny pre-
ferreds" is a notable example. Another example, bearing directly on our
subject, was the widespread failure to make proper comparison with
prior-year pooled results in annual reports, a laxity that produced dis-
torted presentations until the SEC finally cracked down on the practice.8
Under the circumstances, a reaction was inevitable. Leading author-
ities, among them A. J. Briloff (of "dirty pooling" fame), called for
changes,' and the SEC pressed the APB for action. The result was the
issuance of Opinions 16 and 17,10 re-establishing the ground rules for the
use of pooling.
It should be noted that Dr. Briloff did not advocate the absolute aboli-
tion of pooling (his alternatives are not too clear), an attitude shared
by many authorities, including Professor Snavely, who defended pool-
ing,"' and the SEC itself. After studying ARS No. 10 (on goodwill),
the then chief accountant of the SEC (Andrew Barr) wrote, as follows,
to the AICPA on the subject of pooling:
There is no expenditure or disbursement of resources when Stock is
issued. The company issues a fractional interest in its net equity and
earnings potential for which it receives a capital contribution....
In periods of high market price levels, purchase accounting tends to
introduce inflationary values into the balance sheet when the assets and
intangibles of the acquired companies are valued at the market price of
the stock issued. These amounts usually cannot reasonably be expected
to be recovered from the earnings of the acquired companies. The fi.
nancial abuses arising from such practices were an important consider.
ation in the passage of the Securities Acts and the Public Utility Hold-
ing Company Act.
An acquisition for common stock is a capital transaction which in-
creases both total assets and equity, and the acquisition of a profitable
business increases the earnings of the enterprise.
We would have to agree that in most business combinations, one
company is acquiring the other, but we do not agree that an acquisition
for stock is the same as an acquisition for cash or necessarily should be
accounted for in a manner similar to a cash purchase. 12
Since 1970, the merger movement has subsided considerably. The
8 Securities Act Release No. 4910 (June 18, 1968).
0 Briloff, Dirty Pooling, ACCOUNTING REv. 489-96 (July 1967).
IoAPB OPINION No. 16, BUSINESS COMBINATIONS (1970). APB OPINIoN No, 17,
INTANGIBLE ASSETS (1970). No further reference will be made to these Opinions.)
11 Snavely, Pooling is Good Accounting, FINANCIAL ANAl,. 3. 85.89 (Nov.-Dec. 1968).
12 Letter from Andrew Barr to the AICPA (March 1969).
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indications are that recent mergers have been undertaken with greater
caution than generally prevailed before 1970. Of course, the bear mar-
kets we have been experiencing have had something to do with this, but
there is good reason to accord Opinions 16 and 17 much of the credit.
Another major change is the elimination of abuses in the EPS area,
thanks largely to APB Opinion No. 15, which, among other things, put
the spotlight on dilution caused by common stock equivalents. More
recently, the bear market has stimulated a considerable number of trans-
actions in treasury stock, an activity that has a bearing on future pooling.
(Treasury stock transactions will be discussed later.) These post-1970
developments suggest that reopening the pooling issue at this time is
premature. At most, what is called for is a tune-up, not a major over-
haul.
THE COMPROMISES OF OPINION 16 AND THEm EFFECTS
In evolving its opinions .on business combinations, the APB was con-
fronted with some fundamental premises of a conflicting nature. If a
corporation buys a building for $1 million cash, or for $1 million worth
of stock (market value), it records a value of $1 million. If it buys a
corporation whose sole asset is a building worth $1 million (which is re-
corded on the acquired corporation's books for $100,000), issuing stock
instead of cash, shouldn't it also record a value of $1 million? Most
members said yes; it seemed so simple. But most poolings are not that
simple.
Corporations are more than buildings-they involve people, products,
processes, know-how, and customers, an aggregation that engenders an
intangible earning power usually called "goodwill." This aggregation
produces an accounting result based on historical cost concepts, EPS,
which ultimately is reflected in a company's stock values, values deter-
mined by the market, not by the company. And when companies com-
bine, these elements also combine, but in a fashion that is not always
arithmetical. Given the many other areas of accounting that relate to
this subject, it is easy to understand how dissension arose, and why the
Board membership broke into factions according to whether they advo-
cated pooling as then practiced, pooling reform, size-test pooling, or
purchase accounting.
After a period of deadlock, the Board decided that the best it could
do was to "reform" pooling. In addition, the Board agreed, in deference
to an SEC request, to require amortization of goodwill (over 40 years)
when purchase accounting is used. The Board's rationale in its explicit
1974]
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acceptance of the validity of pooling is attested to in the following pas-
age from Opinion 16:
Validity of the concept. Those who support the pooling of interests
method believe that a business combination effected by issuing common
stock is different from a purchase in that no corporate assets are disbursed
to stockholders and the net assets of the issuing corporation are en-
larged by the net assets of the corporation whose stockholders accept
common stock of the combined corporation. There is no newly invested
capital nor have owners withdrawn assets from the group since the stock
of a corporation is not one of its assets. Accordingly, the net assets of the
constitutents remain intact but combined; the stockholder groups remain
intact but combined. Aggregate income is not changed since the total re-
sources are not changed. Consequently, the historical costs and earnings
of the separate corporations are appropriately combined. In a business
combination effected by exchanging stock, groups of stockholders com-
bine their resources, talents, and risks to form a new entity to carry on
in combination the previous businesses and to continue their earnings
streams. The sharing of risks by the constituent stockholder groups is
an important element in a business combination effected by exchanging
stock. By pooling equity interests, each group continues to maintain risk
elements of its former investment and they mutually exchange risks and
benefits. . . . The fractional interests in the common enterprise are re.
allocated-risks are rearranged among the stockholder groups outside the
corporate entity. . . . Each stockholder group in a pooling of interests
gives up its interests in assets formerly held in addition to an interest in
the assets of the other. The clearest example of this type of combina-
tron is one in which both groups surrender their stock and receive in
exchange stock of a new corporation. The fact that one of the corpora-
tions usually issues its stock in exchange for that of the other does not
alter the substance of the transaction. . . . [emp.basis spplied]
Implementing the Board's decision to reform pooling, Opinion 16 set
forth a number of requirements that combinations would have to meet
to qualify as poolings of interest. Perhaps because they resulted from
compromise, heavily influenced by the antipoolers who were anxious to
restrict poolings at any cost and mindful of the alleged abuses (on which
there was not complete agreement), these criteria are not always as sim-
ple as might be expected:
1. The parties combining must be entirely independent companies
merged through an exchange of voting common stock for voting
common stock (in uniform proportion) in a single transaction with
no strings or contingencies (future payments or stock issuances).
2. The equity interests of the companies must not have changed within
two years prior to combination and no treasury shares can be acquired
between initiation and completion of the combination (to prevent
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restructuring of capitalization and bail-outs by means of large trea-
sury stock acquisitions).
3. No cash may be involved, and no plan may be entered into for re-
acquiring the shares or otherwise assuring a cash realization to the
shareholders of the acquired company.
4. No significant assets may be sold within two years after the combina-
tion.13
5. Combinations entered into shortly after year-end date cannot be re-
flected retroactively. This prevents a company from papering over
its losses by pooling with a profitable company after its year-end.
In addition, disclosure requirements were strengthened in order to
avoid any misleading implications.
Opinion 16 eliminated or modified certain requirements for qualify-
ing as a pooling that the Board, or its predecessor, had previously sup-
ported in various pronouncements. One of these requirements concerned
the relative size of the constituent companies. As proposed in ARB 48,
this so-called size test would be based on a ratio of no more than 20 to
1. This proved a feeble restraint in the nineteen-fifties, and eroded
quickly; the reformers were soon calling for limits of 3 to 1 and even 2
to 1. The same view was gaining ground in the United Kingdom. Nev-
ertheless, after considerable and often acrimonious debate, the Board
agreed-by a bare two-thirds majority-that the relative-size criterion
simply could not support an accounting principle, and the size test was
dropped. E'en the then chief accountant of the SEC concurred with'
this view, although his opinion, expressed some time before Opinion 16,
was his own and did not reflect the Commission's view.1'
The requirement for continuity of ownership interest was clarified.
Previously, continuity of interest had been interpreted to mean that
shareholders (of the acquired company) could not dispose of their new
shares immediately. (Practice at that time had, however, allowed dispo-
sitions of about 25 percent.) But shares of stock are as fungible as
grains of wheat, and a shareholder should be entitled to sell his shares
(or buy shares) before or after a business combination. Such a transac-
tion, moreover, does not alter the continued existence of ownership in-
terest (one shareholder merely replaces another), unless the sbres are
redeemed by the company, since it is the shares that represent the own-
ership interest rather than the holders. Then, too, there is no justifica-
tion in accounting theory for restricting such sales on the acquired side
13 If so, the resultant gain or loss is treated as an extraordinary item, a condition that
remains in effect even though extraordinary items are now severely limited under APB OPN-
ION NO. 30, REPORTING THE RESuLTs OF OPERATIONS (1973).
14 See Barr supra, note 12.
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of a combination and not on the acquiring side. Reflecting these con-
siderations, Opinion 16 permitted the shareholders of both constituents
to trade shares in the open market before and after the combination.
However, the companies were prohibited from the following actions,in
the two-year period before pooling: (a) buying shares from sharehold-
ers so as to shrink capitalization in anticipation of a pooling, and (b)
using company resources (or guarantees) in subsequent trades of the
"selling" stockholders.
This position cleared the air considerably. In the past, it had been
common practice to partially liquidate a company (for cash) prior to
pooling to enable certain controlling shareholders to obtain cash, or for
the acquiring company to limit its acquisition to that portion of the
company it wished to continue operating by arranging for the acquired
company to declare a liquidating dividend to the old shareholders before-
hand.
Antipoolers often cite the purchase of treasury shares as a particularly
objectionable pooling practice. They hold that since the shares can then
be used by the company in poolings, such purchases are equivalent to
using cash for a business combination, which calls for purchase account-
ing. This is irrelevant to poolers if the purchases are made on the open
market or from persons unrelated to a prospective combination; a com-
pany is always entitled to shrink its capital, or trade its shares, if the
trades do not involve constituents to a pooling or a proposed pooling.
The antipoolers were persuaded to accept purchase of treasury shares
when clearly undertaken not for pooling but for other purposes such as
stock options and stock-purchase plans. Reference was made to a "sys-
tematic pattern" of treasury purchasing as a criterion for these purposes.
This compromise was not satisfactory to either party, and the controversy
has continued.
In an attempt to resolve the question, the SEC issued ASR No. 146,11
which went beyond Opinion 16 and proposed severe restrictions on the
purchase of treasury shares to provide stock for stock options, purchase
plans, or for the conversion of convertible preferreds and debt, In the
present bear market, companies have considered their own stock an ex-
ceptional investment, and have made substantial treasury stock purchases,
which they hope to use to redeem outstanding convertible stocks and
bonds at a later date when prices recover. The SEC now contemplates
placing severe limitations on treasury share purchases of this type. Un-
15 SEC, Accounting Series Release No. 146 (Aug. 24, 1973).
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der pressure from the profession, however, the SEC suspended the effec-
tiveness of ASR No. 146, pending further study.'0
This writer is forced to admit his total inability to perceive the rele-
vance of treasury share purchases in the open market to a pooling that is
not contemplated at the time. If a company can shrink its capitalization
in the open market after a pooling (as is permitted), why can't it do it
before a pooling, if the market is right. Unless the "selling" stockhold-
ers in a pooling receive cash for their shares, cash is not involved and
the pooling concept is not violated. The continued refusal of antipoolers
to accept this argument, principally because they see no difference be-
tween the use of cash or stock in a business combination, has burdened
us with a compromise that has no basis in logic. Obviously, further re-
consideration of this issue is needed.
THE PROBLEMS OF PURCHASE ACCOUNTING
Opinion 16 did away with the freedom to choose between the pool-
ing method and the purchase method. In effect, the method is now dic-
tated by the terms of the exchange. Any combination not meeting the
strict criteria for a pooling must be recorded as a purchase. Of course,
it is a simple matter to structure the combination as either, if both groups
of shareholders are open-minded regarding the manner in which the
merger or acquisition is to be effected. When stock is used in a purchase,
however, and market values are high, the accounting consequences of
the purchase method are awesome, because of the required restatement
of asset values of the acquired company to market value and the conse-
quent amortization of goodwill. Under these conditions, pencils are
sharpened if the pooling method is not available. In the final analysis,
there is every reason to believe that the new rule has made for sounder
mergers.
When the purchase method is brought into play by the use of cash
or debt, the costs (fair value) ascribed to the assets purchased are pre-
sumed to be readily measurable in the aggregate (the total purchase
price), and there remains only the task of allocation. Most accountants
agree that the excess of such aggregate value over the values ascribed to
tangibles and specific intangibles is an indefinite intangible representing
many factors-an excess commonly described as "goodwill." But when
stock or assets instead of cash or debt are used in the purchase of an oper-
1 6 Securities Act Release No. 5429 (Oct. 5, 1973). ASR 146 was reinstated however
in SEC Accounting-Series Release No. 146A (Apr. 11, 1974), which, among other modifica-
tions, removed the taint from treasury stock purchased prior to April 11, 1974 that did noc
conform.
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ating company, the determination of the purchase price or "cost" as used
in accounting is not so easy. Opinion No. 16 says:
The fair value of an asset received for stock issued may not be reliably
determinable, or the fair value of an asset acquired in an exchange may
be more reliably determinable than the fair value of a noncash asset giv-
en up. Restraints on measurement have led to the practical rule that as-
sets acquired for other than cash, including shares of stock issued, should
be stated at 'cost' when they are acquired and 'cost may be determined
either by the fair value of the consideration given or by the fair value
of the property acquired, whichever is the more clearly evident.
In practical terms, this means that, since goodwill (in all its facets) is
always one of the assets acquired in the purchase of an operating com-
pany, the purchased company cannot be specifically valued by reference
to values of the assets. Its "purchase price" is therefore determined by
the fair value of the securities issued, and, for this purpose, market quo-
tations are generally used. This is the approach being followed today
in most business combinations employing the purchase method.
It is no secret that share values may bear little or no relation to the
underlying asset values at certain times. In an exchange of stock for
stock of two publicly traded stocks, the exchange rates are usually pre-
dicated on the relative market quotes (plus a "sweetener"). Using the
market values of the shares issued as a basis of valuation, the accounting
result can thus be horrendous under the purchase method. If the aggre-
gate market value of the shares issued is less than the book value of the
acquired company, a condition common in bear markets, the assets will
be written down, producing an increase in earnings (from lower depre-
ciation) that would not reflect economic reality. If the market value of
the shares is greater than the book value acquired, a condition associated
with bull markets, the resultant lower earnings (from increased deprecia-
tion and amortization of goodwill) would be equally misleading. In
view of the fact that a bear market seems to be the order of the day,
this consideration has immediate relevance.
At present, the stocks of many companies are being traded at values
far below book value. A good example is American Airlines, which, at
December 31, 1972, had a book value of about $21 per share. In De-
cember 1973, it was trading in the neighborhood of $8 per share. An
aggressive and enterprising company could offer its shares at an exchange
value of $10-11 per share (assuming CAB permission is granted) and
effect a pooling. Under the purchase method, the net assets of Ameri-
can Airlines would have to be written down approximately 50 percent
(about $290 million), and future earnings would be raised by a conse-
quent reduction of about $25 million in depreciation. Thus, a losing
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company might suddenly become a profitable company! This is unrealis-
tic from either an accounting or an economic standpoint. It should be
apparent that depressed market values have no relationship to the value
of underlying assets; and the same is true of inflated market values.
To further demonstrate the fallacy of the purchase method, some ex-
amples of poolings that took place during the bull market of the late six-
ties are given in the Appendix. These examples, involving mergers be-
tween publicly traded companies, show how the mergers would have
been reflected under the purchase method and what they would look
like if current stock values were used. The examples were specially se-
lected because it is believed that they conform to the more important
pooling criteria contained in Opinion 16-this was rare in the sixties.
Thus, they represent exchanges of voting common stock for voting com-
mon stock of publicly traded companies at exchange ratios reflecting the
relative stock values at the time, plus a small sweetener to induce stock-
holders to accept the offer.
In each case, it is clear that if the purchase method had been applied
and market quotations used as the measurement of underlying asset value,
there would have been a need to inflate both tangible and intangible
assets by amounts ranging from $12 to $151 million. There is every
indication that it would have been impossible to avoid ascribing large
portions of these excess amounts to goodwill and amortizing them over
a 40-year period in accordance with Opinion 17. The combination of
such amortization and the increased depreciation on written-up tangibles
would have depressed their earnings severely. If the shares that were
originally issued are now valued on the basis of November 30, 1973,
stock prices, these same assets would require adjustments ranging from a
deficiency of $22 million (actual write-down from original book values)
to an excess of only $45 million. Of course, this shows what a bear mar-
ket can do to stock values, but, more to the point, it shows that the use
of the purchase method coupled with stock market values that can fluc-
tuate severely can be distorting.
Referring specifically to the first illustration in the Appendix, one can
visualize the effect of applying market values in the application of the
purchase method. The merger between Litton Industries and Stouffer
Foods on March 31, 1967, was effected at a time when Litton common
was selling at $104 per share, Stouffer was selling at $27 a share, and an
exchange ratio of .312 of Litton for 1 of Stouffer was used. If purchase
accounting had been applied, the net assets of Stouffer would have had
to be written up by $66 million, or 218 percent. At November 30, 1973,
Litton was selling for $9 per share (adjusted). While many subsequent
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factors may have a bearing on this depreciation in market value, it
would appear that the Litton value in 1967 was inflated (as was Stouf-
fer's) and that placing such a value on the Stouffer assets would have
been unrealistic. When the market values of both constituents are in.
flated (as was the ca'e in this illustration), pooling preserves some rea-
sonableness in the accounting.
Admittedly there is one major flaw in this exercise: It is doubtful that
the mergers would have taken place if purchase accounting had been
mandatory. "As if" research in accounting is always subject to this sort
of consideration, especially since it is well known that management is
unwilling to enter into a transaction if the accounting result proves un-
realistic. Unfortunately, the use of stock market values or market sales
not involving the company itself is becoming more prevalent in account-
ing. It has occurred in certain instances in which corporate ownership
changed hands through substantial public offerings of stock. The SEC
is considering the imposition of purchase accounting whenever 50 per-
cent or more of the common stock of a company changes ownership,
and recently the Commission asked the FASB for a determination on
this question. In one case, where 100 percent ownership of a subsidiary
was sold to the public, the SEC insisted on a revaluation of the net assets
to conform with the proceeds of the offering.17
CONCLUSION--QUO VADIMUS
The pooling method of accounting for business combinations makes
it possible to report the results of the constituent companies' operations
subsequent to combination on the same historical basis as before it, so
that meaningful comparisons may be drawn. The tendency to inject
stock market values into accounting valuations of underlying assets
should be suppressed for the present. Assuming that the old abuses of
pooling have been substantially curtailed by the strict standards laid
down in Opinion 16-and many believe this to be a fair assumption-
it would seem that, for the time being, pooling will have a place in cor-
porate accounting as long as the accounting profession continues to use
the historical cost method as the universal basis for determination of
earnings.
Purchase accounting, while it has the advantage of updating the tan-
gible values for one constituent of the combination, has drawbacks that
far outweigh this advantage. The most important of these are:
1. The failure to provide informative comparisons with past results,
The fact that only one constituent of a business combination is "fair
17 See Hughes Tool Company prospectus dated Decembex 1972.
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valued" hardly makes for a useful comparison with past results (ex-
cept where the assets comprise a very small part of the total assets
of the combined constituents). Furthermore, even if it were pos-
sible to fair value both constituents, it is extremely doubtful that an
informative comparison would be feasible, because, thanks to the in-
adequacy of our present standards of measurement, the accountant's
determination of fair value may not even approximate true value.
If we cannot agree on the proper accounting for portfolios of market-
able securities, oil discovery and development, and investment real
estate, how can we agree on the value of a block of stock given
in exchange for stock or for the package of assets, tangible and in-
tangible, that the stock represents?
2. The unrealistic approach to goodwill. Assuming that meaningful
values could be determined for business ,combinations, we must still
face the problem of goodwill. Today, the concept of goodwill is
applied to a wide variety of situations. Accountants can no longer
indiscriminately label it with universal descriptions such as "the
tendency of customers to continue" or "the purchase of earnings in
excess of a return on tangible assets."
Properly speaking, goodwill in business combinations is the excess of
a cash purchase price over the fair value of tangibles and intangibles
that can be identified. This excess represents an intangible that is at-
tributable to certain factors, some of which are very difficult to pin down.
These factors tend to vary between businesses (especially between non-
capital-intensive businesses). Consider the following situations: A one-
product company manufacturing a gadget presently popular with the
adolescent market; a popular soft-drink bottler with a (no-cost) perpetual
franchise and established routes; a research organization with a record of
scientific discoveries and successful development of scientific products;
a multiproduct company engaged in the manufacture and distribution of
name-brand foods; and a successful retail chain-store operation.
Is it not reasonable to suppose that in these different business opera-
tions, the excess will be attributable to different factors? Careful analy-
sis will probably show that goodwill arising in different transactions pos-
sesses different attributes calling for different accounting.
While the varying aspects of goodwill have been recognized in a
general way, the problem has not been given the consideration it de-
serves. This consideration may not be feasible until the objectives of ac-
counting are defined. In the meantime, a number of approaches have
been proposed: These vary considerably in validity, but even the best
cannot be recommended without major reservations. The most impor-
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tant of these proposed approaches are: Immediate write-off to equity-an
evasion rather: than a solution; permanent capitalization until loss of
value becomes observable; amortization to income-which creates a dis-
tortion of income produced by the goodwill; and the creation of separate
asset and equity accounts reduced periodically on an arbitrary basis. This
last recommendation is associated with the new chief accountant of the
SEC, John C. Burton, who advanced it in a Financial Executives Institute
study, which, by his admission, cannot be defended on the grounds of
absolute truth or even revelation. 8
3. The prevalence of mixed bases that would result if purchase or new-
entity accounting resting on fair value were permitted at this time.
This mixture of bases would be confusing and meaningless to the
readers of financial statements. This writer does not oppose the con-
cept of the ultimate use of fair value basis accounting or valuation
bases that depart from present generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples. But these issues should not be attacked piecemeal; what is
needed is a significant research effort to determine what valuation
bases can best serve the measurement bases of financial statements
as a whole. Now that the Study Group on Accounting Objectives
has issued its report, the subject needs full exposition, and agree-
ment must be reached on this basic issue. Only then will it be worth-
while to reopen the difficult issues of poolings vs. purchases and
goodwill.
A CONCLUDING PLEA
The action of the FASB in reopening consideration of basic combina-
tion principles is inappropriate at this time. We have not yet resolved
the many burning issues inherent in historical cost accounting-market-
able securities, oil and gas accounting, investment real estate, deprecia-
tion, inventory valuation, price level, etc. Many, if not most, of these
subjects will not be resolved until the fundamental framework of ac-
counting for the future is determined. Despite the precision with which
reported results regularly appear, accounting has not yet matured to the
point where we can assume that it is measuring performance adequately.
To tinker with business combinations, which is perhaps the most sophisti-
cated area of accounting, without resolving these basic issues, would be a
repudiation of good sense.
18J. BURTON, ACCOUNTING FOR BUSINESS COMBINATIcNS (1970) (Financial Executives
Research Foundation).
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APPENDIX
COMPARISON OF ACCOUNTING FOR BUSINESS COMBINATIONS ON POOLED BASIS, PURCHASE B
Issuing company
Other combining company
Combination valuation dam
At combination valuation date (Note 3):
Issuing company
Other combining company
Shares to be issued in combination
Exchange ratio
Issuing company's market quotation per common share at
November 30, 1973 (Note 3)
LT6N INDUTR , INC.
STOUFFER FOODS CORP.
TELDYN, INC.
RODNEY METALS. INC
March 31, 1967 December 1. 1967
No. of Market No. of Ifarket
Common Shae Quotation Comma Shas Quo. ;a
Outstanding Per Shire Outstanding Petr Sha
21,460,100 $104.25
2,956,590 27.00
922,456
.312 for 1
$9.21
8,470,000 $134.00
925,000 36.63
290,000
.31351 for 1
$24.78
In Dollars In Dolars
(000 omitted) % (O Omited)
Net assets acquired on pooled basis (Note 4):
Issuing company
Other combining company
If combination accounted for on a purchase basis, excess
(deficiency) of cost over carying basis of other com-
bining company's net assets based on market quota-
tions at (Note 3):
Combination valuation date
November 30, 1973
Net change
If combination accounted for on a "new-entity" basis
(Note 5), excess (deficiency) of cost over carrying
basis of both constituents' net assets based on market
quotations at (Note 3):
Combination valuation date
November 30, 1973
$ 402,50O
30,250
$ 432,750
$ 65,920
(21,750)
($ 87,670)
93 $ 153,090
7 10,150
100 $ 163,240
.218
(72)
(290)
$1,913,700 442
(213,480) (49)
$ 28,710
(2,960)
( 31,670)
94
6
100
283
(29)
(312)
$1,011,190 619
54,400 33
Net assets attributable to common equity (Note 6):
pooled basis
Based on market quotations at combination valuation
date (Note 3):
Purchase basis
New-entity basis
(12/27/73)
Aggregate Per Assregae per
(000omitted) Common Share (000 omitted) Common SZ
$ 302,050 $13.49 $ 143,510 $ 16.38
367,970 16.44 172,220 19.66
,215,750 98.99 1,154,700 131.82
NOTES:
1. Combinations represent (a) acquisitions involving common for common or commoc
net assets and business, ad (b) constituents both publidy hdL
2. Dollars approximated to the nearest ten-thousadths, except for per share amoats.
3. Market quotations represent (a) at combination valustioa date, the doting sales pek
the day preceding public announcement of the proposel combiaton or day apptoxi
ing date of acquisition agreement, and (b) at November 30. 1973. the clsng sales
adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends since dae of combinai=
4. Net assets acquired on pooled basis derived from pro forma finandl dan include,
proxy statement relating to proposed combination.

APPENDIX (Cont'd)
AND NEW-ENTIT BASIS (NOTES I AND 2)
TRANSAMMC CORP. AMFAC, INC FORMOST.McKESSON. INC.
TRANS INTERNATIONAL FRED HARVEY "21 BRANDS, INC.
AIRLINES CORP.
January 17, 1968 Marh 15. 1968 September 2, 1969
No. of Marker No. of Market No. of Market
Common Shares Quotation Common Shares Quotation Common Shares Quotation
Outstanding Per Share Outstanding Per Share Outstanding Pet Share
23,643,663 $53.63 2,466,184 $39.62 11,033,412 $27.12
6,276,768 25.38 484,800 36.00 2,678,275 9.25
3,138,384 533,280 1,004,353
1 for 2 1.1 for 1 .375 for 1
$19.97 $28.88 $11.63
In Dollars In Dollars In Dollars
(000 omitted) % (000 omitted) 9 (000 omitted)
$ 565,470 97
17,250 3
$ 582,720 100
$ 151,050 876
45,440 263
$ 82,050 90 $ 190,990 94
9,170 10 13,120 6
$ 91,220 100 $ 204,110 10
$ 11,960 130 $ 14,120 108
6,230 68 (1,440) (11)
(5 105,610) (613) (5 5,730) (62) Cs 15,560) (119)
$ 910,920 156
9,680 2
$ 27,630 30
(4,610) (5)
$ 207,820 102
21,240 10
Aggregate Per Aggregate Per Agegate Per
(000 omitted) Common Share (000 omitted) Common Share (000 omitted) Common Shae
525,270 $19.61 $ 91,-220 $30.41 $ 118,700 $ 9.86
676,320 25.25
1,436,190 53.63
103,180 34.40
118,850 39.62
132,820 11.03
326 520 27.12
"!New-entit basis, as used here, refers to use of market quote of eAch costituent to a
combination as the basis for asset revaluation of the respective constituents (not a Ben-
erally accepted accounting prindple), following the logic that if one constituent is so
valued so should the other be. It should not be confused with a new-entity approach sone-
times advocated, in which both sides revalue (to current value) il tangible ad specific
inangible asset and goodwill is ignored.
"Net asses attrlbutale to common equity" gives effect to involuntary liquidation value
of p eferr stock where applicable.
